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Introduction 
This paper explores political and ideological aspects of the 
feudal paradigm in an Indian context. The historical setting is 
north India during the first four decades of the nineteenth century. 
These were the first four decades of direct colonial rule in this 
western part of Bengal Presidency: large scale warfare against 
the East India Company's forces gave way to rural crime and 
conflict at the local level; the government of the Company sought 
to assert its control, and the Company's commercial and revenue 
policies increasingly affected rural society. 
In particular, I am interested in the political activities and 
ideas of people belonging to a broad stratum of rural society: 
landlords, peasants, artisans and the itinerant poor. Some rebelled 
periodically against the Mughal state, and continued from time 
to time to resist its successors in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.! Some also took to dakaiti (banditry and organised 
robbery) and thagi (robbery by trickery and/or murder). 
Those known as thags, and tried for thagi, however, often 
spoke of their activities in terms of military "service" - cakari 
seems to have been the actual word.2 They called their leaders 
jamadars, a title of military rank, and many seemed to enjoy leaving 
hard work on the land for what could be more lucrative or dignified 
period on the road. Kinship often did provide a basis for cooperation 
between individual thags or dakaits, and colonial officials compiled 
elaborate genealogical tables to prove it.3 However, it seems 
that political links were more important here than kinship or ritual 
as principles of organisation. 
My argument is that within their groups on the move, thags 
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and dakaits showed deference to their jamadar or leader; they 
used martial symbols of status and power; and they conducted 
their operations within a fragmented polity over which the Company 
and its regional clients were trying to assert control: these features 
point directly to aspects of the feudal paradigm. 4 
It is possible to outline three broad types of political activity 
in rural north India in the early nineteenth century. These partly 
correspond to the size of the political arena, the scale of the 
social units eng·ugcct in conflict or warfare, and the objectives 
of those involved. 
I would identify the first type as rural conflict at the local 
level. Disputes over land or its revenue often led to "affrays" 
between groups of landlords and followers, and punitive or 
extractive raids could also be part of this conflict. Villagers and 
the itinerant poor joined in as the landlords' supporters and 
retainers, or as mercenaries and bandits. An official decision 
which adversely affected a landlord, might prepare the way for 
conflict. 
When Company officials moved from the background, and 
became directly involved in a local dispute, it was possible for 
conflict to escalate. It then resembled a second type of conflict, 
which I Sf!e as local or larger scale resistance t<> the Company 
or to its regional client states. This type was often a response 
to political pressure from these higher authorities. I argue that 
both these types of rural conflict, with which this paper is largely 
concerned, were often closely related, and took a course which 
accentuated the power of landlords, preserved local autonomy 
where possible, and maintained ideas of deference, loyalty and 
pride within the armed group. 
The . third type covers the occasions when peasants attacked 
or robbed landlords, planters or money-lenders, and perhaps, as 
"social bandits", 5 broke the ties of deference and registered their 
protest. On a larger scale, there were also many rebellions and 
uprisings. 
Parts I to IV of the paper deal with the question of the relevance 
of the feudal paradigm to India; the political aspects of resistance 
and rural crime under early colonial rule; ideas of deference and 
symbols of power held by members of roving armed groups such 
as thags and dakaits; and finally, the way in which ideas about 
feudal power could explicitly or implicitly be bound up with colonial 
policy towards the rural elites. 
I have invoked the feudal paradigm for an account of resistance, 
banditry and rural crime in early colonial India, not as a model 
to be superimposed from without, but as a construct which at 
certain times corresponds quite closely to indigenous ideas and 
political forms. 6 
While the paper deals with landlords, peasants and bandits 
in India, it also addt·esses some important theoretical problems. 
Does feudalism refer to forms and concepts which are enmeshed 
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solely within the framework of European history? Concerning 
transitions from feudalism to capitalism, is self-generating 
capitalism the only proof of a preceeding feudal stage? And what 
is the place of banditry and rural crime in the context of growing 
central power or state-formation? 
I. The question of the relevance of the feudal paradigm for India 
The period spanning such events as the death of the Mughal 
emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, the grant of diwani in 1765, which 
allowed the East India Company to collect the land revenue in 
eastern India, and the Mutiny and Revolt against British rule in 
1857, is crucial in Indian history. This paper does not discuss 
the history of this period in terms of a grand confrontation between 
a "feudal system" and the European agents of "world capitalism". 
I do argue, however, that there are aspects of the resistence to 
commercial penetration and ~olonial control which are meaningful 
in terms of a feudal pa.radigm. 
I refer to aspects of the feudal paradigm, rather than to 
feudalism, because I see the latter as a construct made up of 
certain attributes. A society could be called feudal if: 
(1) a weak central authority gives land to powerful local magnates 
in return for political and military allegiance, or else regional 
powers assert their autonomy at the expense of central or 
state power; 
(2) production is mainly agrarian, and wealth and power are derived 
primarily from land; 
(3) deference and submission are more important than ties of 
kinship as a basis for political cooperation; and 
(4) ties of patronage and dependence obscure or retard nascent 
class divisions between landed and landless. 
I would stress the dynamic rather than the merely structural 
features of this paradigm, especially the power struggle between 
centre or state and region or smaller state in the making.7 Here 
I avoid specific reference both to fiefs, manors, vassals and serfs.l 
and to the rise, decline or "persistence" of feudal institutions.ts 
I have here referred to feudalism neither as a phase of history 
between "primitive" or classical and modern capitalist epochs, 
nor specifically as a mode of production. These are important 
issues which I discuss below. 
With regard to the distinction between kinship and feudalism 
in point (3) above, l have drawn on Bloch's classic account.9 
For the idea in point (4) of nascent class divisions being obscured 
in a feudal society, I have drawn partly on Marx's writings. Although 
Marx depicted the history of all previous societies in terms of 
class struggles, including opposition between lord and serf,lO 
it was only under the capitalist mode of production that capitalists 
and capital would exploit the working class and labour, not just 
in class terms, but "in a direct economic sense")l Labour was 
alienated from the worker, and appropriated by the capitalist.12 
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Marx also contrasts the political relationship between the feudal 
landlord and his workers or serfs, partly his property and "partly 
linked to him through a relationship based on respect, submissiveness 
.and duty", with the situation when land became a commodity 
.as private property. It was inevitable: 
"··· that the rule of the property owner should appear as 
the· naked rule of private property, of capital, divested 
of all political tincture; that the relationship between 
property owner and worker should be reduced to the economic 
relationship of exploiter and exploited ••• n13 
The producer or worker "could dispose of his own person only 
after he has ceased to be bound to the soil, and ceased to be the 
slave or serf of another person".l4 
On the question of the specificity of feudalism and feudal 
terminology, Thorner for one thinks that they have western 
European connotations: the "full complex", with feudal lord, vassal, 
fief, feudal contact, manor and serf, occurred only in areas of 
"extreme Western Europe and Japan".l5 Technically this is true, 
but there are analogies beyond Europe, especially for the fief 
and the "feudal lord". In India there was no sense in which serfdom 
could be legally enforced and then legally abolished, as in France 
in 1793, central Europe in 1848 and Russia in 1861.16 However, 
to a varying extent there have been forms of "agrestic serviture" 
in India since classical times. Share-cropping, bondage through 
debt and bound labour' persisted in most of India into the colonial 
period and beyond.l7 
Soboul has outlined the persistence of feudalism beyond 
1789-1793 in terms of the legal rights retained by French landlords, 
and has dealt with antifeudal aspects of peasant protest.l8 While 
there were not these same legal rights in pre-colonial India, those 
who have argued for the persistence of feudal features in India 
have focused on the enduring coercive power of rural landlords, 
and on the symbolic manifestation of their power and status. 
Raychaudhuri, himself of an east Bengal zamindar (landlord) family, 
has dealt with ways in which some zamindars could move in a 
western sphere, while on their estates retaining feudal "pretensions" 
and power. He refers to the survivals of feudal ties in the praja 
- maharaj (subject - great king) relationship; the maintenance 
of "feudal" retainers made up of lathiwalas (clubmen), river dacoits 
(bandits) and others; and the "occasional atavistic throwbacks 
to the days of the robber barons".19 
There is a connection here with the descriptions by Kosambi, 
Sharma and Thapar of an Indian form of feudalism •• In this view, 
the main features are political fragmentation, and the rise of 
landed intermediaries who had military obligations. For Sharma, 
this rise led to the subservience of the peasants. He also writes 
of serfdom, and peasants as semi-serfs on donees' land. Thapar 
deals with the important question of the grant to the "feudatory" 
not of land but of land revenue, by arguing that in practice a 
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"feudatory" exercised hereditary power over the land, especially 
when the king's control was weak. Sharma and Thapar identify 
a self-sufficient and village-based economy, with an emphasis 
on land revenue and weak internal trade. In Kosambi's view, villages 
needed metals and salt from outside, and hence were not completely 
self-sufficient, and he identifies "the slow increase of trade and 
commodity production" as the underlying difference between 
"feudalism from above" and the following stage of "feudalism 
from below".20 At any rate, the congruence which these historians 
identify between economic and political structures in Ancient 
India is also a key feature of the Marxist view of western 
feudalism.21 
This brings me to the question of feudalism as a mode of 
production, implied by feature (2) of the paradigm above. While 
it is possible to sustain a logical distinction between fragmented 
feudal socio-economic units and consolidated world capital,22 
I would argue that the feudal construct has more to offer for 
political analysis, and that the economic dimension of the "feudal 
mode of production" can be expressed more clearly by 
acknowledging the importance of agrarian production by peasants, 
artisans and labourers. Thorner, for example, argues that medieval 
European feudalism was a specific form of the peasant economy, 
and he subsumes Marx's feudal and Asiatic modes of production 
within a broader category of peasant economies.23 This approach 
has the benefit of avoiding purely western categories for world 
history,24 but in my view, it does not adequately present changes 
within "peasant economies" over time. Does not a feudal construct 
at least introduce a clear historical dimension into social, political 
and economic analysis? 
It is precisely from this historical perspective, however, that 
Anderson also argues that feudalism existed only in Europe and 
Japan. He rejects any view which sees feudalism as a universally 
applicable core within variable political shells, and which explains 
that the industrial revolution first occurred in Europe because 
of the distinctive "political and legal superstructures" there. 
Rather, he argues that it is the genealogy of feudalism and its 
past as the precursor of capitalism which makes it uniquely 
European.25 
To rephrase Anderson's argument, does the fact that India 
did not undergo some self-generating capitalist "take-off", provide 
another reason for denying India a feudal past? This in turn raises 
other questions: to what extent did colonial rule block or divert 
the forces of economic change in India? What was the nature 
of the transition from pre-colonial to colonial society? In Pavlov's 
view of India before the emergence of capitalism there in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, British rule and British 
merchant capital was a type of extractive, parasitical growth, 
and "traditional relations" remained largely undisturbed. Pavlov 
argues that " .•. India had in a sense 'skipped' the stage of late 
feudalism ... "26 
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Bayly in his 1mportant if somewhat impressionistic book, presents 
a very different model of an intrinsic block to capitalism in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He argues that the 
commercialisation of kingly and local power after the Mughals, 
instead of freeing the labour market and introducing capitalism, 
merely buttressed that power in a more commercial and 
bureaucratic form.27 Bayly draws attention to the important 
issue of commercial production and urban growth, and presents 
well the dynamism of the pre-colonial economy of north-west 
India. However, I would argue that there are more complex reasons 
for India's failure to move towards capitalism, than the commercial 
and urban buttressing of local power. The process which 
strengthened regional powers at the expense of Mughal control 
also made colonial penetration easier. The eighteenth century 
saw the approp1·iation and consumption of non-commercial produce, 
especially in the course of military conflict. It is also important 
to note the effects of India being drhwn into the world market, 
and of the extractive activities of British merchants and the East 
India Company.28 I would thus place more emphasis on the political 
events and economic changes of the latter part of the eighteenth 
century. To return to Anderson's proposition, my view is that 
the failure to move through an internally generated transition 
to capitalism, does not preclude the possibility that India had 
political and economic features analogous to western feudalism. 
Indeed as Bayly has sbown, commercial dynamism, urban growth 
and local power were perfectly compatible in post-Mughal India. 
Finally, there is the important question of whether the concept 
of feudalism distorts the ideas and political forms conveyed through 
indigenous terms, whether Sanskrit, Persian, Bengali, Tamil or 
other. Stein, working through indigenous categories, arrived at 
non-feudal models such as the "segmentary" and "peasant" states.l 
the "war-state" and the "nayaka system" of warrior magnates.2::J 
The terms alone are not enough, however since words like raja 
(king) or samanta (meaning neighbour, vassal, leader, or even 
"feudatory prince")30 take on their full meaning only within a 
specific social and historical context. To refer to "the warrior-ruler 
model of the Ksati·iya",31 or to jajmani as the basis for 
state-formation,32 or to use a phrase in Bengali like madhyajugiya 
samanta-pratha (meaning "medieval feudal system")33 is to adapt 
and extend terms or concepts within a western sociological model. 
Original texts are invaluable for providing an insight into the 
ideology of deference and power. A passage from the Hitopadesa, 
a text of the twelfth century or earlier, reads: 
"Those brave men, devoted to their master (bhatrbhakta] 
and grateful, who sacrifice their lives for their master 
[svamin], go to heaven. 
Wherever a brave man is killed, surrounded by his enemies, 
he obtains the eternal worlds, if he does not show weakness 
(cowardice in battle)". 34 
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This relationship between the bhartr (protector) and his bhakta 
(devoted) follower, 35 conveyed through Sanskrit terminology, 
can be seen to point directly to a key feature of the feudal 
paradigm. 
II. Resistance and rural crime: political conflict under early colonial 
rule 
The British gained territorial control over Bengal and Bihar, 
with the grant of Diwani in 1765. Between 1801 and 1803, that 
control extended into the north-west. Parts of central India were 
added in 1818, the Panjab in 1849, and the process culminated 
in the annexation of the rest of Awadh. in 1856. Control within 
the frontier was fiscal, through the assessment and collection 
of revenue; judicial, through law, courts, magistrates and police; 
and military. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
nominally independent states beyond the colonial frontier were 
increasingly pushed into a dependent position. At the local level 
there was often violent resistance to colonial or colonial-backed 
control. This could take the form of refusal to pay revenue; 
harbouring "criminals"; or military conflict with the Company's 
battalions or with soldiers of the regional states. 
In response to this pressure by central or regional authorities, 
economic and political ties between landlords, villagers, mercenaries 
and bandits might be strengthened to the extent of forming an 
autonomous mini-state. This process is very much part of the 
feudal paradigm. 
A striking feature of the political landscape in north-western 
India in this period, was the large number of fortified houses and 
mud forts. In Etawah district, for example, the magistrate in 
1808 listed a total of 456 forts. 36 This is indicative of a polity 
which was fragmented at local and regional levels. 
Landlords ruled their domains from these mud forts, and were 
assisted by their retainers, peasants or mercenaries. Landlords 
might use stick-wielding lathiwalas to forcibly collect revenue 
from peasants within their domains. When they launched a punitive 
or predatory raid outside their domains, their victims would probably 
call them dakaits (gang robbers or bandits). Or if they were 
unknown, slipped away or used trickery or disguise, they might 
be called thags (those who cheat, rob and kill). Thagi and dakaiti 
were thus bound up with what Max Harcourt usefully calls the 
"feudal idiom of politics".37 
Many of those who were captured and tried as thags and dakaits 
made depositions to the authorities. These documents are only 
available in translation, and since they often served an official 
purpose as judicial evidence, historians should use them with some 
caution. 38 Nevertheless, these depositions convey popular ideas 
concerning power and status, and provide an invaluable insight 
into personal histories of illiterate villagers, set within a broader 
agrarian and political context. 
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While it is difficult to generalise about the social origins of 
those convicted of thagi, it seems that few thag leaders or 
"jemadars" were zamindars, or revenue-collecting landlords. 
However there were a number drawn from a broad stratum of 
moderate 'peasant-landholders'. 
Futteh Khan is interesting as a thag leader. He states that 
after an expedition in which four were murdered: 
" ... ! remained in my own house for about a year and a half 
at Guntoulee, working upon my fields as a cultivator, for 
I rented one hundred begas [bigha, approx. 5/8 acre] of 
land, and employed labourers; .• n39 
The timing of his departure from that expedition is also significant: 
"The season of cutting my crops had arrived, so I left the gang ..• " 
together with some of the thugs, and he says he stayed at home 
for six or twelve months then went on another expedition. He 
also says "the villagers knew that I was a man who went from 
home occasionally, but they knew not that l was a murderer!"40 
Futteh Khan was thus a peasant landholder who also went on thag 
expeditions. He was also concerned with the ritual component 
of thagi. 41 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the 
link between landed wealth, and status within and sponsorship 
of the Hindu pujas (devotions) and other rites performed, apparently 
by both Hindus and Muslims, before and during thag expeditions. 
Often dakaits also performed a puja before a raid, hoping for 
success. 42 
There were other thag landholders. Ramzan, who for a while 
collected revenue as a zilladar on a salary of four rupees per month, 
held land jointly under what sounds like bhaiachara tenure: 
"I was and am now the fourth shareholder of the village 
of Aiter, which pays one hundred Rupees a year to 
Government as revenue. The other shareholders are relations 
of mind, but not Thugs, they manage the village affairs.n43 
He also liveu eisewhere, and referred to "our village of Gudapore 
in Oude", from where he set out with Madara on thagi. He left 
there and took his family to Rudowlee where he lived for three 
years, still following thagi.44 Such rnobilit~' doe!" not denote great 
wealth, nor does his monthly salary as zilladar. 
Dhoosoo stated that after one expedition he stayed at horne 
for two months, " ... cultivating in my fields, for I rented three 
or four bighas of land, chiefly however, as a blind to conce.al that 
I was a Thug, and to make a show that I was a cultivator". 4<> Even 
if it was so, he can be seen as another thag jemadar apparently 
drawn from this stratum of 'peasant-landlords'. 
There is an example of a thag zamindar. Rambux said he was 
a zamindar in the Company's provinces, in the Furruckabad district: 
"If I had not wherewithall to pay rents to the (E.I.) Company, 
and owed two hundred Rupees revenue, 1 would get it from 
Thuggie on the roads, and not from a banker, why should 
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I steal it! I know not how to steal, but I have learnt Thuggie, 
and would get the money that way!"46 
The context for this comment was the distinction six "approvers" 
(King's evidences) made between thagi and stealing. Futteh Khan 
said, "What God gives us, He gives us in thugie; God is the giver, 
we never steal!-"47 For Rambux, thagi was a culturally acceptable 
way of augmenting the revenue demanded from him as a zamindar. 
For the itinerant poor, on the other hand, thagi could be an option 
in times of dire need, or could provide a form of military 
employment. 
I turn now to present some cases from Etawah and Agra districts, 
and the British-Maratha frontier in ce.ntral India, to show how 
thagi and dakaiti (extractive or punitive raids within the region) 
could escalate into armed resistence to new and more vigorous 
colonial intervention. Here we see the connection between what 
I have outlined as two types of rural politics. The context is the 
East India Company's attempt to implement its agrarian policy, 
collect land revenue, make the frontier secure, and extend its 
judicial power into the countryside. 
With territorial control the East India Company gained the 
right to assess the amount of revenue to be paid, to "settle" with 
those whose duty it was to collect it and to ensure that they paid 
it. The decision not to pay revenue had clear political consequences. 
In the frontier district of Etawah in 1808, Ruggool, recently the 
zamindar of Balteegurh near Shekoabad "contemptuously" resisted 
the process of the collector and the process of the Zilla Court, 
directing him to deliver up the possession of his "estate" to Bugwunt 
Sing the malguzar. The acting judge recommended military force 
in the event of further resistance. Apparently Ruggool had 
frequently plundered the neighbouring landholders, and "burnt 
their houses with impunity .•• " His house at Bulteegurh was 
surrounded by a mud wall, and he was said to have between forty 
and fifty armed followers.48 It seems that it was now Bugwunt 
Sing the malguzar who was now responsible for revenue payment, 
and that Ruggool had been displaced by him. However Ruggool 
was not prepared to abide by the decision of collector and judge, 
and plundered the neighbourhood with his followers. While it 
is not clear whether these raids precede or follow his displacement, 
this example shows how one ex-zamindar could place himself 
beyond the law, retreat behind mud walls, and go forth with his 
followers to raid the district. 
The details concerning a dakaiti in Etawah district in 1809, 
show the connections between a zamindar with three or four mud 
forts and his brother with a garhi (fortified house), and their sepoys, 
horsemen and villagers. The leader of the dakaiti apparently 
used money from the raid to redeem some land he had mortgaged 
to the zamindar. It seems he was a sepoy of the zamindar, and 
the latter was charged. The agrarian context of dakaiti, patronage, 
and armed resistance to some attempted arrests, emerges clearly 
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here.49 
The pargana of Sindhouse in the Chambal region on the border 
between British and Maratha territory provides a third very 
interesting example. Part of the interest lies in the clash of 
perspective between zamindars and British. Halhed in an early 
report wrole: 
Of the 16 villages of Purhuarha, Sindous Khass Birauree, 
Bindowa, Huruowlee and their huglas [sic] were, 'till my 
arrival the resort of a species of robbers denominated by 
the zumeendars who protect them and participate in their 
spoils, their sipahees or soldiers; by the rest of the world 
Thugs; .••. n50 
Sindhouse became important for British account of the spread 
of thagi: Sleeman wrote of the "old Sindouse families" of thags,51 
and F.C. Smith WI'Ote of their "headquarters" in pargana SindouseA 
and Halhed's attack which "dispersed" them in every direction.5;,: 
However the main interest of Sindhouse lies in the link between 
crime and patronage, and in the resistance these largely Rajput 
communities showed to both Maratha and British overlords. Even 
though the pargana fell within the region ceded to and conquered 
by the British between 1801 and 1803, its position seems to have 
been somewhat anomalous, and a surveyor was instructed not 
to give any cause for suspicion amongst frontier "chiefs".53 
However as late as 1812, Halhed wrote that Sindouse should be 
considered "hardly conquered". No civil officer of the government 
had been to the interior of the district; Law reached Sehson on 
the Chambal River, "but hearing of the determination of the 
inhabitants to resist him, [he] returned •••• " The situation of revenue 
affairs there was as "equally deplorable" as that of the police, 
and "until the zumeendars agree to a settlement... the police 
department will be far from improvement .••• n54 The British hold 
over the people of Purheeaha was fairly tenuous: 
They have constantly refused a settlement, they have ever 
placed every obstacle in the way of the teshildar,/for no 
European revenue officer has yet dared to go among 
thPm,/they always have opposed by force the measurement 
of their lands, and they have turned out and ill treated 
the shaunus placed over their crops. They have consequently 
obliged the officers of government to endeavour to t•ealize 
the revenue by Khaum Tuhseel.55 
Kham tehsil was a method of revenue collection direct from the 
peasants, when the zamindar would not come to terms.?6 
Halhed reported that the sixteen villages of Purheeaha were 
controlled by four "head zamindars" and his view of the local 
polity is very striking: 
These sirdars are absolute, their relations and brethren 
are the actual zumeendars, and the power they possess 
under the feudal system, the whole population being armed 
and the face of the country adapted to their mode of fighting, 
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renders them almost invincible .... 57 
Halhed estimated that the sixteen villages of Purhuarha including 
Sindhouse, contained 7500 potentially armed inhabitants who could 
relv on 8500 to 14500 allies from the Maratha states58: a total 
of 'as many as 2Z,OOO available to fight British attempts to make 
a land settlement, collect revenue and set up the police. Halhed's 
figure of 7500 combatants, which- is more than double a later 
estimate of Purhuarha household population, is probably 
exaggerated, but it does indicate the potential for resistance. 
Purhuarha and Sindouse at this time are noteworthy for other 
reasons as well. The Maratha raja Madhu Singh had been responsible 
for paying annual revenue of Rs 8000 for taluka Purhuarha up 
to the end of 1807-1808. His position was now eroded by the new 
revenue settlement between the British and the village zamindars 
with an annual increase of revenue of Rs 500. These zamindars 
apparently wanted troops to be sent "to dispossess Mohdo Sing 
of his forts at Sindousee ... " Madhu Singh petitioned, agreed to 
the revenue assessment and to the introduction of police, and 
promised obedience to government orders.59 Then in April (?) 
1810 he evacuated his fort at Sindouse, where apparently there 
had been a garrison of 250 men, and now the British were free 
to make a "permanent settlement" with the "original proprietors", 
and to introduce police in the pargana. 60 A police darogah and 
his "establishment" took over the fort, and were authorised to 
make any small repairs which seemed necessary for its security. 
With police power extended to a part of the country which had 
long been "the residence of the most desperate offenders", there 
was some prospect they would now be speedily caught.61 These 
offenders were the ravine-dwelling "Tugs and morauders [sic]" 
mentioned by Law in 1809.62 The installation of the darogah 
into the raja's fort is a potent symbol of the intrusion of colonial 
rule into this region. The thags were to be the next target. 
However the British still met resistance. In 1812 a British-led 
detachment of infantry attacked "Suntokh the son of the rebel 
Lolljee" in a village near Sindouse on a high bank of the Sind river, 
and surrounded by ravines; the "rebel gang" fled under fire; it 
was said that Lolljee had been in the village and that amongst 
those killed were "a notorious Thug chief, two Musslemen jummadurs 
of banditti and some of Lolljee's adherents who have fled from 
the Company's dominions.n63 
In another extraordinary incident, in October 1812, Halhed 
the assistant magistrate and his party were fired upon in Sindouse1 
and Maunsell (a British officer) and two others were killed.6 4 
As a grim retaliation and warning, Popham reported that "the 
extensive village of Murnaee in the Mahratta country", near where 
Maunsell had been killed by its former inhabitants "who were 
accomplices of the rebel Lolljee" had been "burnt and destroyed" 
without opposition: 
"I have employed people to level evey house-wall with 
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the ground, and shall cause the site of the village to be 
ploughed over with jack-asses in the plough which has been 
generally supposed to deter people from building near the 
spot again. I have warned the zeemeendars of the 
neighbouring Mahratta villages that it is my intention to 
destroy every village that shall give· refuge to the rebel 
Lolljee or any one individual of his party •.. n6a 
Popham also reported that he had been informed that the "Maharaja" 
(Sindhia) was "very anxious to have the people within his frontier 
punished, as his authority over them has been little more than 
nominal."66 Popham captured Lolljee and "through the interference 
of the resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindea" seven others 
(including three leaders) who were involved were handed over 
to Perry.o7 
Sindouse provides an indication of resistance on the colonial 
frontier, and the nature of the response, amounting to the 
obliteration of a village in independent Maratha territory. By 
early 1813 military "Pioneers" had been retained in pargana Sindouse 
to construct "a road which might admit the passage of artillery 
into that district •.. " a measure from which the Adjutant General 
expected the future "security and tranquillity" of that part of 
the zilla.68 
The British sought to bring pressure to bear on the frontier 
region of Sindouse through the Maratha court at GwHlior, pressure 
which Sindhia apparently was keen to apply. The British were 
not averse to conductiHg punitive military operations in lV!aratha 
territory after Maunsell was killed in Sindouse. 
This material shows how rural crime and conflict, conducted 
by landlords or their followers, could escalate into urmf"d resisterce, 
as the colonial ruler·s intervened directly or through a client state 
on the frontier. These three cases exemplify, I think, aspects 
of the feudal paradigm. In section IV, I discuss how mud forts 
and an armed population caused some colonial officials to think 
of the feudal analogy as well. 
Even though dakaiti was widespread in Bengal, for historical 
reasons the agrarian context was somewhat different by the early 
nineteenth century. The Company had collected land revenue 
there since 1765; there had been a steady commercialisation of 
crops such as indigo; and private landownership had been introduced 
with the Permanent Settlement of 1793. There are cases of "dacoit" 
attacks on mahajans - money-lenders who might acquire land.69 
Violence connected with indigo cultivation is also a different 
feature. In Nadia district in 1808, for example, the house of a 
European indigo planter was attacked by between 120 and 150 
"dacoits" after he and his watchman gave information to the 
magistrate which led to the capture of a "dacoit" leader. The 
links between "dacoits" and villagers, as well as their resistance 
to the attempt by the magistrate and 35 sepoys to catch the 
attackers, are similar to the type of escalation seen in north-west 
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and central India at the same time. However, it is important 
to note the agrarian overtones in the attack on the planters house, 
in which property worth Rs 5000 was stolen; the planter and three 
others were wounded, and one of his servants was "cut to pieces"; 
and two of the outhouses were "fired."70 While it was the arrest 
of the "dacoit" leader which probably sparked the attack, their 
target and the resistance of both villagers and "dacoits" seems 
to indicate elements of the third type - rural protest. Perhaps 
there are also signs here of "social banditry". 
III. From the plough to ho?'ses, sticks, swords and guns: ideas 
of deference and symbols of power. 
This section deals with the attraction which some peasants and 
artisans felt for violent life on the move, as thieves, mercenaries 
or bandits, in north and central India in the early nineteenth century. 
From their depositions after capture, it emerges that criminal 
expeditions were often launched in times of need, for example 
when a landlord could not pay revenue, or perhaps when a poor 
labourer felt the effects of famine. As well as providing profit 
or subsistence, however, many obviously enjoyed a more military 
life on the roads. I am interested in the way the military idiom 
could not only enhance status, but also provide temporary freedom 
from hard work behind the plough. While members of these roving 
bands showed deference to their leaders, they were also evidently 
proud of their martial lifestyle and accoutrements. For peasants 
and the itinerant poor, sticks, swords, guns and horses were symbols 
of power and status. 
In 1820, for example, a person calling himself Raja Mihrban 
Sing of Gour in Awadh, moved through the country in regal style, 
with two hundred followers, and women being carried in "doo!ees 
and palkees" (pananquins). There had been an attack on a treasure 
boat on the Ganges in Bihar, by two parties of "dacoits" with 
guns, swords and spears, and a very large sum was stolen. The 
joint magistrate of Monghir later received news, suspected that 
the raja and his followers were robbers, and sent government 
troops who were successfully resisted by Mihrban's brother in 
thick jungle. When Mihrban was caught, he said he was a zamindar 
from Awadh on pilgrimage with his followers, but he and other 
prisoners were convicted of either having com mited or been 
accessories to the dacoity.71 While the British regarded Mihrban 
and his followers as dangerous dakaits (Shighalkhor, Budheks or 
Sear Murwas) Mihrban presented himself as a raja on pilgrimage 
with his retinue. An attack on a treasure boat would obviouslv 
help finance such a large-scale expedition. , 
In the earliest group of statements and confessions by thags 
which I have found, dated 1810, the deponents reveal interesting 
details about their lives, their means of livelihood and their links 
with criminal leaders. These ten thag deponents were mostly 
of low-ranking castes. The two main occupations which emerge 
from the depositions are agricultural labour as "cultivators", or 
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"service". Kalee Khan's description of them and his position in 
the group is significant: 
" ..• all the asamies [peasants, or 'tenants'] who are present 
are my associates; and I am their master and leader.n72 
There are other links between these individuals: some shared 
jamadars (leaders) or thag "teachers"; or live·d in the same village 
previously, or were related. 
Gholam Hossyn, the 16 year old manihar, gives a vivid account 
of life on the move, going from patron to patron looking for 
"service". The important stages of Gholam's life were as a thag 
victim (his father was killed), thag adoptee, then personal service 
for a number of patrons. Gholam went to obtain service with 
his uncle: he had served others but his active involvement in thagi 
developed out of links of kinship and service. 7 3 
Kalee Khan, of darzi (tailor) "caste", says he was formerly 
Hindu, and when 11 years old, was caught by the army of Nawab 
Numdar Khan, when he became a Muslim; then for 20 years he 
remained at Furruckabad, then went to relatives of his own caste 
who lived at Needhana in pargana Kasgunge. Some time later 
he went into the service of Kulander Buksh, where he became 
acquainted with Jewahir, a thag and the leader of a body of 
horsemen. 
Kalee Khan mentions the criminal technique of thagi (strangling 
and cutting), and the murder of "many a man of property". He 
apparently served under a number of jemadars, and at one stage 
was employed for eleven years as a cultivator, then for another 
year "cultivating our fields ... " At another time he went to where 
Meer Khan's army was camped.74 "Service" to military patrons 
provided the context for Kalee Khan's thagi, and he too sh()ws 
how service could be interrupted by a long period of agricultural 
labour. 
For some other deponents, thagi was a response to dire need. 
Sooleman (alias Chilumsha) was a Muslim and lived in Tuddyeywarra 
in "Ellaka Beejapoor". He was "a cultivator by profession" but 
had been a thag for the previous three years, and his father had 
been "a sepoy in the Nizams service ... ". He was first employed 
in "cultivating land", and when there was a famine Moheeoodeen 
Buddaree gave him a rupee and said he would give him more if 
he went with him. Sooleman agreed and about three years before, 
went with Moheeoodeen Buddaree and joined "the gang of Thags" 
of three jemadars. 75 
The occupations of these thags reflects two major options 
available for this stratum of small peasant, artisan or landless 
labourer in this region of India at the outset of territorial colonial 
control: agricultural work or military service. Subsumed under 
"service" was thagi. 
The depositions are available only in translation, but on one 
occasion at least, the British official left the original Hindustani 
228 Feudalism 
word for "service" in the text. Futty Khan the deponent related: 
"I, and my constant attendant Rumzan Pugla, proceeded 
in the cold weather to Fyzabad in search of service 
(chakuree,) ••• " 
In what appears to be a gloss, p1·esumably added by Paton to show 
that "service" was really a euphemism for "thuggee", the text 
continues: 
" ••. that is, plunder by murder; ••• "76 
Futty Khan evidently referred only to "chakuree", under which 
form of military employment he seems to subsume acts of thagi. 
Of great interest here, however, are the meanings which Rajputs 
in Rajasthan in the Mughal period attached to the terms cakar 
and cakri. Cakar generally meant "servant", and referred to what 
Ziegler calls "clients" outside the ruler's immediate family, but 
including Rajputs both within and outside the ruler's own clan 
and brotherhood. In Marvari usage, the word cakar referred to 
a "military retainer" who held rights over certain villages in return 
for providing arms or military service to his superior, or being 
part of his "patron's" household. He acknowledged his obligations 
by swearing a vow before a devata in a temple. In return, the 
"patron" ruler had to protect his "client", and had to give him 
land or other renumeration. Ziegler argues that this institution 
of "clientship" superseded kinship as the basis of organisation 
in Rajasthan. What is more striking is that cakri or seva signified 
service to the thakur - either himself a god, or a ruler who had 
acquired his kingdom through devotion and service to his duty.77 
The vows of service, and the parallel between service to the lord 
and service to the deity, brings us directly to Kosambi's argument 
that: 
" ••• bhakti, unflicting loyalty to a god .•. suited the feudal 
ideology perfectly. Loyalty links together in a powerful 
chain the serf and retained to feudal lord, baron to duke 
to king."78 · 
Thus, by subsuming thagi under cakari, Futty Khan points to what 
I see as important features of the feudal paradigm. 
I argue that the expeditions of thags and dakaits could enable 
the itinerant poor or wealthier peasants to enhance their status. 
It is important to note here, the symbols of rank and power which 
they temporarily gained through thagi, or even through dckaiti. 
From Shaik Inayut's deposition, it seems that his father's main 
occupation was "service". He said that when he was about 18 
(about 27 years before giving the depositon) he went with Daood 
his father on thagi, "which was his trade.": 
"He said 'come with me my son, and let us go on service 
together.' I was proud to accompany him on what I 
considered to be his vocation, and he gave me a very 
handsome pony of great value to ride [and?] as this was 
my first expedition, it was thought necessary to consult 
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the astrologers as to the best time for setting out, and 
he appointed the day .•. n79 
They lived then in the village of Oja Jugmolee in Gwalior (a central 
Indian state adjoining the colonial frontier). On the appointed 
day he set out on the southern road with his father, "mounted 
on my fine pony, attended by two servants, Man Khan and Munnoo, 
as grooms ••• n80 He was so pleased with the country and his company 
on the road that while his father went home "with his gang" and 
"returned two Ol' three times to the Duckun [Deccan, southern 
region] in his annual Thug expeditions ••. " he himself continued 
on the move with the jemadars for two and a half years; they 
committed murders and gave him a "liberal share of the booty" 
but he was not allowed to participate "as strangler or holder of 
hands ... n81 
Such a life on the move was certainly more lucrative, but 
part of the attraction seems to have been cultural as well: to 
ride a horse, to carry weapons and to have grooms in attendance 
could denote the high military (or even "knightly") status of Muslim 
noble, or of a Ksatriya or Rajput. 
Lukha, aged about 45, provides an even clearer indication 
of this in his deposition. He and his father were: " •.. Rajpoots 
of the Solmkee caste, and have been cnllecl Budh~1ks, since we 
took to the trade of robbery."82 Aoout "5 years before he 
"cultivated some land" in a village in Hutrus; as a result of an 
argument with his father he went to his brother-in-law Madeea 
(a jemadar, leader) who lived in the village of Hutteesn, where 
Man Sing "a very noted leader of Budhuks" also lived. Lukha 
continues: 
"Man Sing asked me, wny I condescended to be a drw1ge 
at the plough, while I might get so much more by following 
my brother-in-law and avoid the continued disputes in which 
J was engaged with my father. 
I was captivated with their discourse about dacoitees, 
and determined to join them - Shortly after, in the season 
of Harvest/March/Man Sing and Medeea set out in the 
disguise of travellers with fifteen followers armed with 
swords, and matchlocks, and proceeded to Naeagon [?), 
five cose west from Mohan in Oude - I accompanied them 
in the merchant's shops or in the suraes [inns] _n83 
Lukha told a story about his forebears, some of whom were formed 
into a regiment of Wuzeer Alee, and when the regiment disper·sed, 
"Some took to tillage, and some to service; and some took to 
dacoitee - Those who took to tillage and service were by degrees 
induced to join the dacoits, from seeing their happier condition." 
His father then went to various places and "subsisted by tillage 
and service, and he never took to dacoitee-"84 He also refers 
to other forebears who "subsisted upon service and tillagen.85 
Lukha thus neatly presents the options for his relatives: tillage 
or service; but in comparison to the drudgery and servitude of 
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the plough, there was the mobility, enhanced image and material 
gains through banditry. 
This is not to suggest that thagi and dakaiti were necessarily 
very "soda!" forms of banditry in Hobsbawm's sense. While I 
cannot here provide details of their victims (some of whom were 
quite poor themselves) it is important to note that recruits to 
a violent life, often with better pay and higher martial status, 
could also become virtually mercenaries in the pay of a local 
landlord. Ramzan was a thag approver (or King's evidence) who 
said that through the influence of his friends, he was taken into 
the service of a zamindar named Molvee Tahawur Allee, who 
made him a "Zillahdur", gave him Rs 4 per month as salary, and 
entrusted him to collect the annual land revenue of Rs 3000 from 
five villages containing three thousand people.86 Ramzan obviously 
enjoyed his rise in status. As the deputy of the molvee who heard 
disputes, he could summon people to his "presence" and make 
them stand or sit: 
" ••. I dressed well, rode my pony, and had too [sic) Sipahees 
to attend me a Putwarree or scribe, ard a Gorait or village 
guard." 
He says it was a good service for three years, that the molvee 
and the villagers were "well pleased" with him, and that he paid 
each village a monthly visit and no one suspected that he was 
a thag. 
"The chief men used to wait on me to transact business, 
and I was supplied with fowls, mangoes, (when they were 
in season), fresh milk, & c. and as I passed along old and 
young made their salam to me".87 
lie ~ays during this service he got leave for a month and went 
on thagi once with a gang of six thags; he left the duties of zillahdar 
to his friend Bucktawur while he was away. He returned for three 
months as zillahdar, but from fear of being seized as a thag, he 
fled to Dunowlee where Phoonda his uncle was zamindar of a 
very large village. Through his uncle, and accompanied by his 
cousin Jean, he made his salam to Raja Surat Sing of Dunowlee, 
who appointed him to collect the revenue of Sapore and Dunowlee 
on a monthly salary of Rs. 3. The land was ten miles in 
circumference, and in those villages there were more than two 
thousand men "whom I cculd at any time call to my presence for 
purposes of collection". To collect the revenue fifteen armed 
men were placed under his orders. He described the raja as a 
"mighty man" with five or six elephants, four hundred soldiers, 
and a fort with one or two cannons; and refused to allow officers 
of the Oude Government to enter his fort. Ramzan was traced 
as a thag after six months there. Paton's order to the raja for 
his seizure evidently induced the raja to advise him to surrender, 
which he did. 88 
"I was fully armed - a sword, shield, pistol,, D matchlock 
and a flint gun, for I was fond of being thus arrayed, and 
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when so armed feared not though forty men stood before 
me.n89 
While Ramzan's weapons and retinue conferred status on him 
he was clearly working on the side of local authority and not against 
it. 
It is important to note here the raja's and Ramzan's symbols 
of power and status. Ramzan's position also illustrates the way 
in which thagi was enmeshed in a fragmented polity, often marked 
by forcible revenue collection within the magnate's domain, and 
by armed resistance to central control. The other point here 
is that the British tried to eradicate thagi beyond the frontier 
by urging central powers like the Nawab of Awadh to control 
the local magnates who protected thags, or by applying more 
direct pressure from the Residency, as Paton did in the case of 
Ramzan's raja. 
I would argue that for these nineteenth century deponents, 
cakari was still imbued with an ideology both of service to the 
military or criminal leader, and of martial pride. A significant 
change, however, was that cakari now depended not on an allocation 
of land, but on a share of the spoils. In a formal sense, thag and 
dakait expeditions were extractive, but they enabled landlords 
to augment their power and revenue, and peasants or artisans 
to possibly enhance their status and eat better at lc'ist. To this 
extent, thagi and dakaiti seem to illustrate well aspects of the 
feudal paradigm. 
As a final indication that cash was not the only currency for 
transactions between thags and landlords, a deponent named 
Shahadut said that he lived in Heera Singh's taluka for twent'' 
years, and he used to give him: 
"Horses and arms, he used besides to receive a chote from 
all the T'hugs who consisted of about 30." 
There were seven or eight (thag) houses in Bowsas village, where 
Khunja used to live, and the two zamindars also used to receive 
a "chote": "It is the custom with all the zemindars".90 The "chote" 
is probably the chauth of the Marathas - the share in revenue 
or booty they took from their territories. While some thags denied 
they gave such a payment, this transaction shows how thags 
expressed their deference through tribute, and how the zamindar 
augmented his wealth. At another level, the giving of horses 
and arms, symbols of martial strength and status, shows how thagi 
was part of a political idiom and structure which in some respects 
seem quite "feudal". 
IV. Colonial polity towards rural elites in India: the discourse 
on feudal power. 
In his classic study of Rajasthan, Tod wrote: 
" ... there is a martial system peculiar to these Rajpoot 
states, so extensive in its operation as to embrace every 
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object of society. This is so analogous to the ancient feudal 
system of Europe, that I have not hesitated to hazard a 
comparison between them .•• n91 
Tod remarked on " ••• the curious coincidence between the habits, 
notions, and governments of Europe in the Middle Ages, and those 
of Rajasthan ... " He thought that each system was based on the 
"patriarchal form" rather than one borrowing from the other. 92 
In stark contrast, Mill observed in his History of British India, 
published earlier than Tod's volume: 
"Such a thing as a feudal system or a liege lord, never had 
a moment's existence in India, nor was ever supposed to 
have, except by a few pedantic, and half-lettered 
Englishmen."93 
This is an ironic comment, because Tod was an orientalist scholar 
as well as a political officer, and James Mill neither knew an 
oriental language, nor went to India. The divergence between 
them represents much more than the differences between 
"orientalist" and "anglicist" scholarship or cultural policy. The 
different views of Tod and Mill about feudalism in India reflect 
two broad areas of administrative concern: on the one hand 
questions of government and the political security of the Company, 
and on the other, questions of revenue settlement, political economy 
and economic policy. 
This section brieflv considers how ideas about feudalism were 
often explicitly or implicitly part of the colonial discourse on 
the rural elite in India. 
In my view, the function of rent- or revenue-collecting 
intermediaries and local magnates within the Company's frontier, 
and of regional powers beyond, posed an important problem for 
the colonial administration in India. Was it best to grant local 
elites private property rights in land, turn them into rent-receivers, 
and strip them of their "feudal" powers, as in the Permanent 
Settlement of 1.793 and other legislation, or to exclude them as 
parasites from later revenue arrangements made directly with 
peasants? Were regional rulers to be seen as members of a fallen 
but loyal aristocracy, or were these client states to be brought 
under direct British rule? 
The Permanent Settlement of 1793, which "permanently" fixed 
the amount of revenue to be paid henceforth by Bengal zamindars, 
was a measure which had a significant social impact, and fuelled 
much official debate. W.W. Hunter wrote: 
"It was vain to expect the ancient rajas of Bengal, 
encumbered with all the costly paraphernalia of their petty 
courts and military retainers, to suddenly transform 
themselves into punctual tax-collectors. Yet this was 
exactly what the Permanent Settlement did expect of 
them •..• 
The ancient houses of Bengal broke down unrJer the strain .... 
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The Permanent Settlement became a success only after 
it had erected a new and shrewder class of landholders 
on the ruins of the ancient aristocracy of Bengal.n94 
Malcolm, writing from a similar perspective, approved of the 
so-called ryotwar (peasant) and village revenue settlements, 
whereby if· "a raja, thakur or zamindar" existed he would retain 
his authority, but not "when extinct": 
"What similarity have such a grade in the Indian community 
to our manufactured zamindars, whom we create from 
a sense of policy, and destroy from a sense of justice?n95 
Malcolm and Hunter seem to draw implicitly on the feudal analogy 
here. The Benares Circuit Judge was more explicit when he 
reported on 11 village frays 11 in 1809. This activity was: 11 ••• strongly 
characteristick of the feudal system and uncivilised nature of 
the inhabitants.-n96 We have seen in Section II how Halhed 
described the power of the zamindars and the armed population 
of Purheeaha in terms of the 11feudal system". Similarly, in the 
part of Awadh which the Company acquired between 1801 and 
1803, the British were confronted by mud forts, refractory landlords, 
armed peasants and bandits. Beyond the frontier the nowab was 
under constant pressure to control this same group of forces, 
who raided the Company's distincts also, but was given limited 
support by the British to do so. It is interesting to note how the 
feudal analogy enters the colonial discourse in A wadh in the early 
nineteenth century. 
The Company applied pressure on the nowab by diplomatic 
means through the British Resident at Lucknow. The position 
of Bentincl<, the governor-general, becomes clear with the 
statement that the 11king11 (nawab) knew that unless he effected 
11a reform", he would not have British support, which Bentinck 
maintained was as necessary to maintain his position against "former 
advisers and minions, as to enable him to subdue the great rebellious 
feudatories in opposition to the government".97 This was Bentinck's 
formula: without "reform 11 , no British support; without British 
support, the king could not resist his "feudatories". 
I can only briefly mention some of the political implications 
here. The case of A wadh shows how "refractory11 zamindars with 
mud forts, cannons and armed retainers could resist the nawab, 
who then sought assistance from the Company. Taking the story 
only as far as 1832, by which time there was some improvement, 
we see that the British continued to support the nawab without 
direct intervention, and that by then the nawab hap been able 
to regain control over local zamindars and villagers. However 
colonial pressure on Awadh continued and culminated not in military 
intervention but in outright annexation in 1856.98 
The case of the nawab shows how the British rulers in India 
sought to create, rather than destroy, an Indian aristocracy which 
would be docile, and loyally serve the interests of the company 
and later the Raj. The nawab was called the King of Oudh, and 
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was painted wearing what looks like a crown.99 The British not 
only circumscribed his power, but invested him with a regal symbol 
taken from medieval Europe. After the annexation of Awadh 
in 1856, the last nowab reluctantly accepted a state pension.! 00 
After the events of 1857, the colonial rulers sought to win 
over many talukdars of Awadh, and sought to forge links with 
them as members of a loyal aristocracy .I 01 Perhaps the event 
which best sums up the British attempt to transform the Indian 
idiom of power, and substitute a "Victorian feudal" one instead, 
was the Imperial Assemblage in Delhi in 1877. At this modified 
durbar, Cohn argues that the British sought to represent their 
authority over a loyal feudal aristocracy, who would be vested 
with banners showing their coats of arms, as symbols of their 
position under the Raj.l 02 
Conclusion: 
My approach to the question of how far early colonial India 
can be seen as "feudal", has been to look at the ideas and activities 
of landlords, peasants and artisans in a specific region. But this 
in turn raises other questions about the nature of the colonial 
impact, and the place of thags and dakaits within a broader process 
of the consolidation of the colonial state in rural areas, and changes 
at local and regional levels.l 03 Bayly has argued: 
"If the dynamic changes in Indian commerce and politics 
provided much of the force behind the British advance, 
they also limited its impact and formed its character.nl04 
Yet from the mid-eighteenth century, in addition to commercial 
penetration, colonial rule was both coercive and extractive. Stokes 
refers to the heavy revenue demand following annexation in 
1801-1803, and to some changes which occurred despite agrarian 
resilience .I 05 However, more than resilience, there was resistance. 
Siddiqi's perspective on this is pertinent. Whereas the British 
had success in their first two decades, against a pattern of local 
plunder, and refusal by zamindars to pay revenue, earlier powers 
did not: 
"Cases of such resistance, which must have been typical 
of the rural scene in the late eighteenth century, suggest 
that the inability to bring the village zamindars to terms 
probably lay at the root of the political and financial 
weakness of the Indian ruling powers."l 06 
Put simply, the regional powers were unable to collect the local 
agrarian surplus. 
This brings me to the question of the link between banditry 
and state-formation. Hobsbawm in his classic study has argued 
that the rise of the mafia in nineteenth-century Sicily "marks 
a transfer of power in the 'parallel system' from feudal to rural 
middle class, an incident in the rise of rural capitalism."l07 He 
rejects a view of the mafia's code as being linked to feudalism, 
and he sees no definite line between mafias (plural) and social 
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banditry)08 Blok is more concerned with private violence, and 
with the rise of mafiosi as "violent peasant entrepreneurs" who 
mediated between a largely feudal peasant society and the modern 
State. He argues that bandits needed political protection to be 
successful, and that they became drawn into a suppression of 
the peasantry)09 Also relevant here is Ranajit Guha's striking 
distinction between two codes of violence: crime/insurgency; 
secretive/open; small-group/mass; total/partial; and 
destructive/appropriative) Ill He writes also of the "grey overlap 
between codes" within a more general motif of "ambiguity")ll 
I would argue that thagi in particular seems to hover between 
crime and protest, social and anti-social banditry. As we have 
seen, within their communities they might be called soldiers, 
but as unknown assailants on the roads they were known as thags. 
They themselves spoke of thagi and cakari. Thags and dakaits 
were part of the local re~i~tnnce which persisted under early 
colonial rule, and to that extent they contributed to the emergence 
and consolidation of local domains) 12 Some thags apparently 
gave a Maratha-style chauth, but I would argue that this extractive 
mechanism was probably less important than the subsistence and 
spoils which group members gained for themselves during an 
expedition. (Some dakaits on the other hand gained huge amounts 
from raids.) Thus while Gough refers to "the Thuggee" within 
the category of social banditry (some as mercenaries)113 their 
range of victims, and their integration into local power structures 
suggest something closer to Blok's model. 
While the consolidation of colonial rule in nineteenth century 
India is in some ways analogous to the growing control over the 
south by the north during the formation of modern Italy in 
Gramsci's view this "hegemony" serves as a terri to rial version 
of the relationship between town and country114 - there are some 
differences, especially concerning the place of thagi. 
During the nineteenth century, the colonial authorities assessed 
the criminality of various groups, and increasingly stigmatised 
many of these as "criminal castes and tribes")15 It seems that 
mercenaries hecame more obviously involved in maintaining the 
power of local officials and lrmdlords.ll6 Dakaiti made the 
transition to the twentieth century as a type of gangsterism, 
occasionally with overtones of social banditry)17 It would be 
interesting to explore further the links between the 
commercialisation of agriculture, the arrival of new landlords, 
rent-receivers and planters, and the employment of lattials and 
those "nuqdees" as retainers.l18 
As for thagi, the loose, mobile network of people who often 
referred to themselves as having been on "service", but who also 
might acknowledge being "thags" in the sense used by villagers, 
was damaged by the arrests from the 1800s, and was evidently 
broken by the operations of Sleeman and his assistants from 1 829. 
Thagi (as it emerges from the depositions cited in this paper) 
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had cultural and political trappings drawn from the rural society 
of northwest and central India. After the colonial crackdown, 
thagi in this particular guise seems not to have re-emerged in 
the changed political environment of the later nineteenth century. 
Within this region, the practice of drugging victims and then robbing 
them was often associated with thagi, but elsewhere, as- in Bengal, 
such poisoning with dhatura and robbery does not appear to have 
been called thagi by villagers or authorities. In Bengal, people 
used other words such as bangu (Sleeman's "bungoo") to describe 
theft on the rivers.119 
It is worth noting that thags appear in popular stories, such 
as those concerning Guru Nanak (1469-1539), the founder of the 
Sikh religion, as people who rob and kiU travellers. Sajjan had 
built a temple and a mosque to lure travellers into his house, kill 
them (by throwing them into a well) and take their possessions; 
in one version he had links with a local raja who usually got half 
of his booty. An important element in the naming of Sajjan as 
a thag, is the fact that he used an outward show of piety to deceive 
his traveller victims.l20 While thags performed rituals on the 
expeditions, the idea of thagi as a murdering cult was developed 
by British officials who had questioned their prisoners.l21 
Another aspect of my paper has dealt with the symbolism 
of power and status in thagi, and this analysis could be t9.ken 
further. Here l would note Guha's exploration of insurr-cnr:y in 
"the highly semioticised world of traditional India",i 2~ which 
has yielded rich and impressive results. Looking mo. e closely 
at these symbols, people on thagi expeditions could carry weapons, 
and even as retainers they would probably enhance their status. 
With dakaits this seems less likely, since a lathi (stick) was merely 
a symbol of power. It would be worthwhile to look more closely 
at the role of the landless in rituals connected with the practice 
of thagi, since this would raise the question of caste, and whether 
they themselves would ride a horse, or would still be "grooms". 
I suspect that on the whole, thag groups merely reproduced broader 
hierarchical relationships between landlords, peasants and artisans. 
Although this awaits further analysis, I would say that in terms 
of point (4) of the paradigm proposed earlier in this paper, thagi 
and dakaiti continued to operate in a political and cultural domain, 
where conflict between landed and landless did not yet appear 
as class conflict. But while dakaiti adapted to later social and 
political conditions, thagi (in the form described by some 
participants) seems not to have survived the crackdown by Sleeman's 
department and other authorities. Here I should add that alhough 
there were many rebellions and other acts of protest in nineteenth 
century India, these are beyond the scope of this paper.l23 
A thag deponent once said, "We only thug from necessity, 
not from pleasure; it is a fearful business - at home we have no 
fear of detection, but on the road we are in anxiety." On another 
occasion he also said, "··· Thuggee is a 'Shikar' (a hunt), sometimes 
successful, sometimes not."124 Not all thag deponents would 
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have agreed with him, but these statements indicate a blend of 
need and martial sport. I would argue that the political and cultural 
contours of thagi and dakaiti, such as the move from plough to 
horse and arms, can illustrate aspects of the feudal paradigm 
in early colonial India. 
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